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ADVERSE POSSESSION AGAINST A RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY.-

Southern Pacific Railway Company v. Hyatt et al., 132 Cal. 240
March 16, 1901). The defendant Hyatt had occupied for over
e years before this action was brought, a portion of the right
of way, granted to the Central Pacific Railway Company, the
predecessors of the plaintiff, by
Act of Congress of July 1, 1862.
Hyatt was in open, exclusive and notorious possession and occupancy of the property in question,
for the period prescribed by
he Staue of Limitations, and had paid the axes hereon as
the plaintiff had also done. It was held below as a conclusion

of law, from the facs found, hat he plaintiff fails in his action
of ejeetmen, and is not entitled o recover possession of he
refusing
premses.
It was held on appeal, reversing the court below, andpossession
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purposes of a railroad is a public use within the meaning of
the Constitution, or not." The court goes on to say that railroads are of such a public nature that no rights can be acquired
against them by prescription. "Railroads are esteemed as public
highways, constructed for the advantage of the public."
Southern Pacific Railway Company v. Burr, 86 Cal. 279, 1890.
In this case a railroad is termed a "qualified highway." It is
stated that "here there was a special grant of right of way of
200 feet in width on each side of the road. This grant is conclusive legislative determination of the reasonable and necessary
quantity of land to be dedicated to this public use, and it
necessarily involves a right of possession in the grantee, and is
inconsistent with any adverse possession of any part of the land
embraced within the grant." An opposite view is taken in the
late case of Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Ely et al.
(Washington Supreme Court, June, 1901), 54 L. R. A. 526,
where it is held on very similar facts, that the "court has not
attempted to determine how much of the right of way was
necessary for the railroad company to use in operating its road,
but it was a determination of the fact of how much of the right
of way the railroad company had abandoned, and how much of
the right of way according to its own determination, it did not
need for the purpose of operating its road, and how much it could
abandon without defeating the purpose for which the grant was
made." It would seem that the railroad officials are or should
be more competent to judge how much land they need in order
to properly operate their road, than legislators, who probably
have little or no knowledge of the necessities of a railroad. If
such officials allow another person to occupy adversely, and use a
portion of their land for a long period of time without interruption, then their very negligence shows that they did not need the
land, and that they thought it of very little value or consequence.
This is not like the case of adverse possession, where the true
owner lives hundreds of miles distant from his property, and very
probably has not the slightest idea that some other person is in
possession of his property, where some excuse might be made,
though it would be a poor one, for here the road was in active
operation and every official of the company from the section boss
up, could and must have known that the defendant was wrongfully and adversely using the property of the railroad company.
The second and really determining reason laid down by the
California court as to why the statute did not run against the
railroad is, that a railroad is a public highway. This contention
is strongly supported by similar decisions in many other jurisdictions. The leading case upholding this view seems to be that
of Olcott v. Pond du Lac County Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678,
1872, where Mr. Justice Strong in his opinion says, "that railroads, though constructed by private corporations and owned by
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. . Very early the question
them, are public highways
arose whether a state's right of eminent domain could be exercised by a private corporation created for the purpose of constructing a railroad. Clearly it could not, unless taking land
for such purpose, by such an agency, is taking land for public use.
Yet it is a doctrine universally accepted that a state legislature
may authorize a private corporation to take lan(! for the construction of such a road, making compensation to this owner. What
else does this doctrine mean, if not that building a railroad,
though it be built by a private corporation, is an act done for the
public use? And the reason why the use has always been held a
public use, is that such a road is a highway, whether made by
the public itself or by the agency of corporate bodies, or even by
individuals when they obtain their power to construct it from
. It is said the railroads are not
legislative grant. . .
public highways per se; that they are only declared such by the
decisions of the courts; and that they have been declared public
only with respect to the power of eminent domain. This is a
mistake. In their very nature they are public highways. It
needed no decision of the courts to make them such. True,
they must be used in their peculiar manner, and under restrictions, but they are facilities for passage and transportation
afforded to the public, of which the public has a right to avail
itself. As well it might be said that a turnpike is a highway,
only because declared such by judicial decision. A railroad
built by a state no one claims would be anything else but a public
highway, justifying taxation for its construction and maintenance, though it could be no more open to the public use than is a
road built and owned by a corporation; yet it is the purposes
and uses of a work which determine its character." See in
accord, Moran v. Ross, 79 Cal. 159, 1889; St. Joseph & D. C. Co.
v. Baldwine, 103 U. S. 426, 1880; Drouin v. Boston & M. Ry.
Co., 52 Atlan. 957 Vt., 1902; B. B. Co. v. Obert. 109 Pa. 193,
1885; Penn. B. R. Co. v. Freeport, 138 Pa. 91, 1890; Bassett v.
Penn. Co., 201 Pa. 226, 1902. In Pennsylvania a railroad is
termed a qualified highway, against which the statute does not
run.
There is, however, a long line of decisions which hold that
railroads are not public highways, and that the statute will run
against them. In Northern Pacific By. Co. v. Ely (supra), it
is held that "a railway company owes certain duties to the public,
but holds and uses its property for the profit of its stockholders.
The cases holding that the statute of limitations affords no
defence to actions for encroachment upon streets and roads are
inapplicable. A railroad is not a public highway in the sense
that it belongs to the people. Railroad officials are not governmental agents whose laches creates no bar. . . . The state
confers the right of eminent domain to enable railway companies
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to efficiently perform their duties as common carriers. But it is
not apparent why the state should be concerned in preventing
investors in railroad stocks and securities from sustaining loss
through the negligence of their agents." Citing in accord, Illinois C. Ry. Co. v. Houghton, 126 Ill. 233, 1888; Illinois C. By.
Co. v. O'Connor, 154 Ill. 550, 1895; Illinois C. Ry. Co. v.
Moore, 160 Ill., 1896; Donahue v. Illinois C. Ry. Co., 165 Ill.
640, 1897; Illinois C. By. Co. v. Wakefield, 173 Ill. 564, 1898;
Paxton v. Yazoo & M. V. By. Co., 76 Miss. 536, 1899; Mathews
v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 110 Mich. 170, 1896. See also
in accord, Coleman v. P & P. M. Ry. Co., 64 Mich 161, 1887;
Pittsb., Cinc., Chic. & St. Louis By. Co. v. Stick7ey, 155 Ind.
312, 1900; Wilbur v. Cedar Rapids & M. Ry. Co., 89 N. W. R.
101, Iowa, 1902; Norton. v. London & N. W. By. Co., I. R. 13
Oh. Div. 268, 1879 (which holds that the statute runs against the
superfluous land of a railroad company) ; Bobbett v. S. E. Ry.
Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 424, 1882 (where it is held that it runs
against the railroad company whether the land in question is
superfluous or not); Erie & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Rousseau, 17 Ont.
App. Rept. 483, 1902; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hasse, 68
Pac. Rept. 882, Wash., 1902, affirming By. Co. v. Ely (supra),
The California court, quoting Jones on Easements, § 281,
lays down this further reason why the statute does not run: "The
prescriptive right to a passageway along the track or right of way
of a railroad cannot be acquired by the public or by individuals,
while the railroad is constantly using a single track over such
right of way. The construction and operation of one track on
its location is an assertion of ownership to the entire width of its
right of way. The presence of one track constantly in use, is a
definite badge of ownership, and the only practical. assertion of
title that can be made. If the public have used paths by the side
of a railroad track for any length of time, the use must be considered permissive and not adverse." In accord, Sapp v. Northern Cent. By. Co. (supra);Penn. v. Freeport (supra). But see
contra Baldwine v. Boston & M. By. Co., 63 N. E. R. 427 Mass.
1902; Ill. C. By. Co. v. O'Connor (supra). The rule laid down
by Mr. Jones would seem to say that the more open, hostile and
adverse the user, the less title can be gained thereby. It certainly
is impossible to serve more notice upon the owner of the property
than that which his senses daily convince him exists. For a path
along a railroad track is in open defiance of a well-known title
and under the eyes of the owners or their agents. If the railroad
can prosecute for trespass, and it is admitted that it can, why
should it not make use of its rights and protect its property
just the same as a private citizen or other corporation?
Counsel for the plaintiff in By. Co. v. Ely (supra) urged
strongly upon the court that a railroad had no right to abandon
all or any portion of its right of way; citing Northern Pacific By.
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Co. v. Smith, 171 U. S. 260, 1897; East Alabama RBy. Co. v.
Doe ex dem. TVisschar., 114 U. S. 340, 1885; Thomas v. West
Jersey Ry. Co., 101 U. S. 71, 1879; such act being idtra vires.
But a close examination of these cases will show that they do not
bear out the contention of counsel. True it is that these cases
decide that a railroad cannot abandon or alienate all the right of
way, and thus incapacitate itself for carrying out the intention
for which it was granted a charter, but they do not decide that
a railroad may not abandon such portion of its right of way as it
does not need. This certainly is one of the strongest reasons
why the statute should be held not to run. But this argument
is restricted to those charters which do not give railroads a
right to lease or sell their property or even mortgage it, and
would not apply to most of the present day railroad charters,
which give those rights.
W.F.N.

